After several decades of neoliberal dominance, during which even left-leaning presidents implemented or defended market reforms, Latin America in the first decade of the twenty-first century entered a period of greater ideological contestation. Since 2000 the debate between statist and market-oriented options has widened considerably, along with the introduction of more statist policies in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. As during earlier shifts in the 1930s and 1980s, the contemporary shift in development models is producing important political conflicts between ideological adversaries.

Much more so than in these earlier periods, however, the conflicts generated by the current shift toward statism at the national level are unfolding along territorial lines. Unlike the twentieth century, when the search for effective development models was dominated by conflict between actors with national identities (such as labor federations and industrialists, presidents and legislators, military generals and national party leaders), understanding the resurgence of ideological conflict today requires closer attention to territorial conflicts between national and subnational actors. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Bolivia and Ecuador. Having monopolized control over most national political institutions, and having repeatedly demonstrated their dominance in national electoral contests, leftist presidents Evo Morales and Rafael Correa have faced their most significant opposition not at the national level but in the subnational regions of the east (Bolivia) and west (Ecuador).

Specifically, these presidents have confronted the emergence of demands for territorial autonomy from each country’s most vibrant economic region: the eastern lowland department of Santa Cruz in Bolivia, and the western coastal province of Guayas in Ecuador. In contrast to the demands for indigenous autonomy that have emerged in Bolivia and Ecuador in roughly the same period of time, and that to date have received more scholarly attention, the demands for autonomy in Santa Cruz and Guayas occupy a very different position on the ideological spectrum.1 Whereas indigenous autonomy movements defend communal models of governance, autonomy claims in Santa Cruz and Guayas focus on the defense of the market-based models that have produced significant economic gains for each subnational region in the past but are now under attack at the national level. In both Santa Cruz and Guayas, private sector entrepreneurs, business associations, and local politicians are the most powerful advocates of territorial
autonomy, but in both cases their proposals for autonomy have resonated substantially beyond elite circles. As a reflection of the breadth of support for autonomy, since 2000 solid majorities of voters in Santa Cruz and Guayas have voted in favor of referenda and popular consultations that call on the national government to recognize sweeping forms of autonomy.

The stakes associated with these autonomy demands are high. First, they have the potential to further destabilize two of the most politically volatile countries in Latin America. Over the past decade, Bolivia and Ecuador have experienced high levels of instability, characterized by the weakening of political institutions, the collapse of traditional party systems, and the toppling of democratically elected presidents. Second, because the demand for autonomy has emerged in each country’s most dynamic region, the outcome of the struggle for autonomy could have serious redistributive consequences. If these regions secure the right to collect and retain higher percentages of fiscal revenue, for instance, fewer funds will be available for investments in less dynamic regions. Significant questions of stability and solidarity are thus at stake in these twin autonomy drives.

The literature on social movements offers the most promising set of conceptual and theoretical tools with which to understand these territorial conflicts. The same concepts that scholars have derived from the study of progressive social movements—including political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural frames—also help illuminate the pro-market autonomy movements in Bolivia and Ecuador. Borrowing from the social movement literature, three related arguments can be made. First, based on the “repertoires of contention” of actors in Santa Cruz and Guayas, these phenomena should be conceptualized as a type of social movement that I label “conservative autonomy movements.” Second, drawing on interviews with movement leaders and participants, I provide a theoretical account of the rise of these two movements, explaining why they have emerged in Bolivia and Ecuador but not in other Latin American countries, and why they have emerged now and not earlier. I emphasize an important structural opportunity in the form of a stark spatial disjuncture that exists between the location of political and economic power in both countries, as well as recent threats to the representation of Santa Cruz and Guayas within national institutions. Third, I explain why the Santa Cruz movement has gained greater traction than the movement in Guayas, documenting how a more advantageous set of opportunities, more challenging threats, more coherent mobilizing structures, and more effective framing choices have generated a stronger movement in Bolivia.

Despite the analytical leverage offered by the social movement literature, the empirical study of conservative autonomy movements exposes important deficiencies in social movement theory, largely the result of selection bias. In the last three decades, Latin Americanists have produced a sophisticated literature on social movements and their consequences for such outcomes as regime change, democratic governance, and party system development. Overwhelmingly, however, scholars have focused on social movements that challenge the economic status quo by seeking to expand the participation of previously marginalized groups. Ignoring movements that adopt more ideologically conservative positions has resulted in conceptual confusion and theoretical arguments.
that are far less general than they appear. For example, social movement theorists have argued that organizational deficits are a common feature of social movements, one that distinguishes them from other actors like interest groups and political parties. According to Sidney Tarrow, social movements tend to lack the stable resources—money, organizational capacity, and access to the state—that interest groups and political parties enjoy. But the assumption that opponents of social movements are “better equipped” is difficult to sustain in the case of conservative autonomy movements.\(^6\) Mobilizing structures like business organizations and elite-financed civic associations have delivered significant resources to these movements, giving them real advantages relative to the types of social movements that have dominated social movement theorizing. Conservative autonomy movements demonstrate that a movement’s organizational deficits should be empirically verified rather than assumed.

At the same time, generous support from well-financed mobilizing structures poses challenges for conservative autonomy movements that are qualitatively different from those facing progressive movements, which generates an additional opportunity for theory building. Theorists have emphasized that all social movements make framing choices, but conservative autonomy movements face special framing challenges due precisely to the significant participation in these movements of political and economic elites. In both cases, movement leaders have sought to overcome perceptions of elitism by framing each movement as a broad defense of territorial identity, one in which cruceños and guayaquileños of all class and ethnic backgrounds can find common cause.

Finally, the study of conservative autonomy movements offers a different perspective on the political opportunity structures that are emphasized in the literature on social movements. Theorists have stressed the opening up of political opportunities as a critical condition for the emergence of social movements. But this emphasis reflects their focus on social movements by marginalized actors, who normally face limited opportunities and who must act quickly to take advantage of suddenly more propitious political environments. When the focus shifts toward movements that bring together elite and non-elite actors, such as conservative autonomy movements, threats loom larger, particularly to elites who seek to defend the status quo, and who are experiencing a decrease (not an increase) in opportunities to press their policy demands. Structural opportunities matter in the emergence of conservative autonomy movements, namely, in the form of dynamic subnational economies that can bolster the credibility of autonomy proposals. However, in response to the vagueness that has plagued opportunity structures as a concept, I offer a more precise and falsifiable theoretical proposition: the spatial separation of political and economic power is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the rise of conservative autonomy movements.

**The Conservative Autonomy Movement as a Conceptual Category**

The first step is to conceptualize the struggles for autonomy in Santa Cruz and Guayas as conservative autonomy movements by disaggregating this category into its component
elements. What do actors in each region mean by “autonomy?” Why does it make sense to label these movements “conservative?” Are these indeed “social movements?”

Movement participants attach many meanings to autonomy, but it is possible to identify a core set of demands. Reflecting their status as home to each country’s most productive private sector activities, the Santa Cruz and Guayas movements seek to secure for local use a greater percentage of the tax revenues derived from these activities. Frustrated by highly centralized budgetary practices, and motivated by the belief that they are heavily subsidizing expenditures in other regions, movement leaders have demanded that an autonomous region should be able to keep between one-half (Ecuador) and two-thirds (Bolivia) of the non-trade tax revenues collected in that region. Although both countries adopted measures of fiscal decentralization in the 1990s, decentralization favored municipal, not regional, governments. As a result, movement leaders in both regions reject “decentralization” as a label that describes their demands, and argue instead that decentralization has already occurred in each country, absent the fiscal autonomy they seek at the regional level.

While these demands for greater fiscal autonomy are critical, at the heart of each movement is a still more radical demand that regions be able to pursue a different development model from that endorsed by the national government. Movement participants believe that fiscal autonomy is insufficient because the private enterprises that generate tax revenue in each region are now threatened by national statist policies. By demanding substantially more room for market forces than allowed in the models adopted by Correa and Morales, both movements have articulated a “one country, two systems” framework of coexistence with national governments. In the words of one pro-autonomy leader, “we are asking the national government for nothing but the freedom to maintain our own successful economic system.”

More concretely, the ability to set a different course from the national government requires not just fiscal revenue but deeper institutional and policy changes. Three changes have featured prominently in the demands made by each movement. First is the transformation of regional councils into legislatures with law-making authority. Second is regional control over land tenure to protect agribusinesses and to prevent the national government from redistributing land. Third is greater subnational control over public security; if police officers respond to national rather than regional authorities, the latter will be unable to enforce their new lawmaking powers, particularly vis-à-vis landless groups that may target agribusiness. While these changes are indeed radical and amount to far more than decentralization, except for the most extreme fringes each movement stops short of separatism. Movement leaders have warned that demands might radicalize if met with intransigence, but for most participants autonomy does not imply sovereignty but rather greater independence within the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states.

Having explained what autonomy means for movement participants, it remains to ask whether “conservative” is appropriate as a descriptive label. Given the support for market-oriented approaches and hostility to statist policies that are often characterized as socialist, these movements could just as accurately be labeled liberal as conservative. But “conservative” is a more useful adjective for several reasons. First, it captures the
essentially reactive nature of these demands, which seek to defend the status quo within Santa Cruz and Guayas at a time when those who control the national government have articulated a comprehensive series of redistributive reforms. Unable to prevent attempts to “refound” the Bolivian and Ecuadorian republics by Presidents Morales and Correa, each of whom has enjoyed popularity levels that are unprecedented in recent history, these movements see in territorial autonomy the best chance to conserve the regional status quo, even as national-level transformations proceed. In contrast to the progressive movements showcased in the social movement literature, redistributive proposals within these regions are noticeably absent from the list of movement demands.

Second, “conservative” accurately describes the right-of-center space that these movements occupy. Despite some volatility in the relationship between these movements and the party system, the parties that have provided the most logistical and rhetorical support for the autonomy drive (PODEMOS in Bolivia and the Social Christian Party in Ecuador) are both conservative parties. Following Edward Gibson’s conceptualization of conservative parties as organizations whose core constituencies are drawn from a country’s upper economic strata, the critical participation of economic elites in these movements also argues for the use of “conservative” as a descriptor.11 Like conservative political phenomena everywhere, conservative autonomy movements must reach beyond the economic elites who form their core and whose interests are most threatened by the statist direction taken by the national government. As explained below, elites in Santa Cruz and Guayas have sought to tackle this familiar problem by emphasizing the common cultural characteristics that are shared by all denizens of the locality, irrespective of class and ethnic differences, and that are presumably under threat from the refoundational efforts of Presidents Morales and Correa. Thus, territorial identity is instrumental to the efforts of conservative movement leaders, who see it as a force that can enlist residents of various class and ethnic backgrounds in what is fundamentally a defense of the status quo.

But are these really movements? Considering the types of actions that have taken place in each region, these autonomy drives clearly qualify as movements. Both cases, for example, fit within Charles Tilly’s synthetic three-part definition of the social movement.12 First, both movements include “campaigns” in the form of sustained and organized drives for autonomy that have developed over the course of many years and in the face of national government inaction or resistance. Second, both movements have deployed a range of repertoires in the form of rallies, petition drives, regionally specific strikes, and statements to the media that criticize the national government and laud local economic successes. Third, both movements engage in what Tilly calls “WUNC displays” by asserting the “worthiness” of Santa Cruz and Guayas as economic powerhouses, by underscoring the extent to which local actors are “united” in defense of autonomy despite their class and ethnic differences, by turning out large “numbers” of participants in carefully organized rallies and demonstrations, and by demonstrating the “commitment” of those who are willing to devote time to attending and organizing these many events.

Territorial grievances are not new in Bolivia and Ecuador; neither is the demand for greater decision-making authority for the regions.13 But regional autonomy demands
coalesced in a new form within the last decade as recognizable social movements. Consider the following timeline in Santa Cruz, whose movement for autonomy gathered strength in the wake of the 2003 overthrow of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, Bolivia’s foremost market reformer. During the interim government that followed his resignation, hundreds of thousands of Santa Cruz residents answered the call from Santa Cruz’s civic committee (Comité Pro Santa Cruz or CPSC) to demonstrate on behalf of autonomy. Buoyed by the turnout for this demonstration in June 2004, movement participants collected over 500,000 signatures demanding a referendum on autonomy, and engaged in a department-wide strike in November 2004 in an attempt to force the national government to respond to their demands.14 Faced with La Paz’s opposition to holding a referendum, over 350,000 people participated in a second rally in Santa Cruz in January 2005, making it Bolivia’s largest-ever public demonstration. In June 2005, shortly before he too fell from power, interim President Carlos Mesa relented and agreed to schedule a nationwide referendum on autonomy. While a majority of Bolivians (56 percent) rejected regional autonomy in this July 2, 2006, referendum, 71 percent of voters in Santa Cruz voted in favor of autonomy. In a subsequent but unofficial referendum on May 4, 2008, held in response to continued resistance from the center, 86 percent of voters in Santa Cruz supported autonomy.15

In Ecuador the roots of the contemporary movement can be traced to protests in Guayaquil in March 1999 that took place after the collapse of the city’s major financial institutions, and that adopted a strongly anti-Quito stance.16 In the aftermath of these protests, a group called Fuerza Ecuador began to collect signatures toward the goal of enabling the Prefect of Guayas, Nicolás Lapentti, to request holding a popular consultation on autonomy.17 In December 1999 the Electoral Tribunal of Guayas accepted Lapentti’s request and scheduled the vote for January 23, 2000. Coincidentally, Ecuador’s President Jamil Mahuad was overthrown in Quito on January 22, 2000, by a leftist alliance between the military and the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador or CONAIE). The following day, 81 percent of those who voted in Guayas approved language calling for autonomy. In response to steadfast opposition to autonomy on the part of the national government, significant demonstrations occurred in Guayaquil on January 26, 2005 (the so-called Marcha Blanca), and on January 24, 2008. In the latter demonstration, 200,000 people turned out on the streets of Guayaquil, where they were encouraged by Mayor Jaime Nebot to remain vigilant in the defense of Guayas’s interests against Ecuador’s popular new president, Rafael Correa.

Turning from these movements’ repertoire of actions to the identity of their participants, economic and local political elites are well represented among the leadership. The important roles played by business chambers, employees of large private sector firms, and subnational elected officials may be difficult to reconcile with the view of social movements “by ordinary people.”18 Indeed, as demonstrated in the remainder of this article, participation by elites has powerfully shaped each movement. Nevertheless, none of the critical actions described above (strikes, petition drives, rallies) could have occurred on such a large scale without the participation of non-elites.
In Santa Cruz and Guayas, many ordinary people have come to believe both that they are victims of centralism and that their material fortunes would improve as a result of changes that would transfer resources to the regions where they live.

Notwithstanding their striking similarities, the Santa Cruz movement has exhibited greater strength in its struggle for autonomy—a divergent outcome explained below. As Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alvarez argue, the impact of social movements cannot be reduced simply to their influence in “conventionally political spheres”; movements alter politics by expanding the very definition of “the political” in a range of “cultural, social, economic, and quotidian” spheres. At the same time, shaping a conventional political sphere—the constitutional revision processes that have dominated politics in both countries since 2006—emerged as a central goal for both movements. Accordingly, their differential impact on constitutional politics can be used as one appropriate measure of the relative strength of these movements. While the movement in Guayas was unable to shape Ecuador’s new constitution, the Santa Cruz movement was able to disrupt significantly the revision process and to secure significant concessions.

In Ecuador Correa and his supporters in the constitutional convention that met in 2007 and 2008 successfully ignored the Guayas autonomy movement. Elected in November 2006, Correa pledged to rewrite the country’s constitution and thereby to put an end to its “long dark night of neoliberalism.” Seeking to influence this new constitution, the January 2008 rally in Guayaquil culminated in a march that presented Ecuador’s constituent assembly with a document titled “the Mandate of Guayaquil,” which called on the assembly to grant provinces the right to petition for autonomy. Correa’s supporters controlled the design of the constitution, however, and opted to make it harder, not easier, for provinces to secure autonomy. Movement leaders organized an aggressive “no” campaign on the constitutional referendum and helped defeat it in Guayaquil, but were powerless to secure meaningful compromises from the government.

In Bolivia, President Evo Morales’s supporters also enjoyed a majority in the constitutional assembly, which produced a draft constitution in December 2007 that likewise failed to include significant autonomy measures. The Santa Cruz movement, however, enjoyed sufficient strength to derail Morales’s preferred plan of action. Marginalized within the constitutional convention, movement leaders organized a pro-autonomy referendum in May 2008 and a series of strikes in August 2008 that prevented Morales from scheduling a national referendum on the assembly’s draft constitution. After weeks of violence and meetings with movement leaders, Morales agreed on October 21, 2008, to a series of key concessions, including the establishment of regional legislatures and protections for current landowners in Santa Cruz who will not be subjected to strict new limits on the size of landholdings. Though Santa Cruz voters still rejected the constitution in the January 25, 2009, referendum, these substantive changes nonetheless can be taken as a reflection of the movement’s strength relative to its counterpart in Guayas. The timeline of moves and countermoves in the ten-month period between December 2007 and October 2008 strongly point to the causal impact of movement-sponsored activities in Bolivia.
Opportunities and Threats in the Rise of Conservative Autonomy Movements

Conservative autonomy movements have arisen due to a similar combination of opportunities and threats that are present in Bolivia and Ecuador but nowhere else in Latin America. The economic dynamism of Santa Cruz and Guayas operated as a critical opportunity for these movements because it enabled them to propose autonomy as a viable response to the sudden decrease in each region’s influence within national institutions. Turning from similarities to differences, the analysis of threats and opportunities also provides a framework for understanding why the environment was more favorable to the development of the Santa Cruz movement.

Why Bolivia and Ecuador But Not Elsewhere? Why Now But Not Earlier?

A critical factor that helps explain why conservative autonomy movements emerged in Bolivia and Ecuador but not elsewhere is the structural disjuncture in each country between the concentration of political power in La Paz and Quito as national capitals and the concentration of economic power in Santa Cruz and Guayas as would-be autonomous regions. No other country in Latin America experiences such a pronounced disjuncture. In most of Latin America, due in part to highly centralizing patterns of state-led industrialization, the economic region that surrounds the national capital is home to the largest and most powerful firms and best-developed private markets for labor, capital, and goods and services. Examples include Buenos Aires, Argentina; Santiago, Chile; Mexico City, Mexico; Lima, Peru; Montevideo, Uruguay; and Caracas, Venezuela. In these cases, where economic and political centers are conjoined, policy disagreements between presidents and private sector leaders are not infrequent. However, due to the overlapping nature of political and economic power in these countries, territorial autonomy is not an option if the country’s most powerful private sector interests oppose the policy direction of the national government. In contrast, in Bolivia and Ecuador the leading economic subregions are not national capital regions, as seen in Table 1.

Despite the economic dynamism of both Santa Cruz and Guayas, few important governmental decisions are made in either region due to policy centralization. In neither case did municipal decentralization in the 1990s challenge the national government’s control over core economic policies. Yet until the last decade, this absence of decision-making authority in Santa Cruz and Guayas failed to produce consequential moves toward autonomy because economic elites in both regions enjoyed significant representation at the center. In Bolivia the economic emergence of Santa Cruz coincided with the national military government of one of its native sons, Hugo Banzer (1971–1978). Santa Cruz representatives served in key positions in Banzer’s government, which steered cheap credits and subsidies toward his home region. In the post-authoritarian period, for nearly two decades beginning in 1985 Santa Cruz was well represented in La Paz due to the electoral successes and coalition-building skills of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario or MNR). Despite having led the
1952 Revolution, the MNR in the 1980s and 1990s served as a reliably pro-market party with a solid base in Santa Cruz. Indeed, the MNR and Banzer’s party (Nationalist Democratic Action or ADN) controlled the presidency for fourteen of the eighteen years that elapsed between the adoption of market reform in 1985 and the fall of the Sánchez de Losada government in 2003 (and in the remaining four years, the ADN governed in partnership with another pro-market party). 23

In Ecuador, for a far lengthier period of time, economic groups in Guayas were also able to exert significant leverage in national institutions, and thereby to protect their core interests. At the end of the nineteenth century, the accumulation of wealth in Guayas due to the cacao boom culminated in the Liberal Revolution of 1895, which enhanced the national power of coastal commercial and financial interests. 24 After a period in the 1960s and 1970s of direct rule by the military—a profoundly Andean institution in which Guayas is poorly represented—the return to democracy in 1979 ushered in a period of influence for the region at the center. 25 Representatives of Guayaquil and Quito have essentially alternated in the presidency over the last three decades. Throughout this period, the electoral success of the Social Christian Party (PSC), coupled with its increasingly clear identity as a Guayas-based party, sustained the region’s influence in Quito. 26 Particularly critical in his role as leader of the PSC is León Febres Cordero, who served as two-term mayor of Guayaquil (1992–2000) following his presidential administration (1984–1988). A vocal opponent of autonomy, Febres Cordero used his extensive influence over legislators and judges in Quito to produce benefits for Guayaquil, including legislation that enabled taxpayers to direct up to 25 percent of their income tax payments to the city.

As long as they could depend on participation in national institutions, economic elites in Santa Cruz and Guayas abided by the concentration of political power in La Paz and Quito, and accepted the limited authority that this arrangement left for their regions. However, a rapid chain of events in each country has threatened politics as usual and

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**Table 1** GDP by Department in Bolivia (2007) and Ecuador (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bolivian Departments</th>
<th>% Total GDP</th>
<th>Ecuadorian Departments</th>
<th>% Total GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>28.92%</td>
<td>Guayas</td>
<td>26.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>24.01%</td>
<td>Pichincha</td>
<td>21.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>Orellana</td>
<td>7.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>Manabí</td>
<td>6.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>4.95%</td>
<td>Sucumbíos</td>
<td>6.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Oruro</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>Azuay</td>
<td>5.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
<td>El Oro</td>
<td>3.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bení</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
<td>Esmeraldas</td>
<td>3.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>.86%</td>
<td>Los Ríos</td>
<td>3.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;3% each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

limited the national influence of these dynamic regions. Critical in Bolivia is the establish-
ment of a powerful indigenous party, the Movement toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo or MAS), which has successfully challenged the hegemony of the three traditional parties that had dominated national politics since the transition and that had gov-
erned to Santa Cruz’s advantage. Whereas the failure of any presidential candidate to receive a majority in the years before 2005 threw the selection of the president to con-
gress, typically ensuring an important role for Santa Cruz, the outright victory of MAS candidate Evo Morales with 54 percent of the vote in 2005 signified a new and threatening era for elites in the department.

The reliability of Guayas’s input in the national government has also come into question. First, over the course of the 1990s, CONAIE emerged as a powerful umbrella organization for highland and Amazonian indigenous groups, though, as discussed below, the political party that it created (Pachakutik) has enjoyed far less success than the MAS in Bolivia. Second, Ecuador has experienced even higher levels of instability than Bolivia, with seven different presidents in the decade that began with the 1997 removal of President Bucaram. In addition to Bucaram, Presidents Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000) and Lucio Gutiérrez (2003–2005) also failed to finish their mandates due to events that transpired in Quito, including widespread street protests and the withdrawal of support by the military. This intense political volatility at the national level contrasts sharply with the dominant and stable position the PSC has enjoyed in Guayas. Since 1992 the PSC has controlled the prefecture of Guayas, the mayoralty of Guayaquil, and majorities on both the regional council of Guayas and on the municipal council of Guayaquil. Third is the success of the anti-party and anti-congress platform articulated by Rafael Correa, who won the presidency in 2006 by running against the traditional parties, including the previously powerful PSC.27 When Correa unconstitu-
tionally suspended congress and held elections in November 2007 for a constituent assembly, high levels of abstention in Guayas in the election of this assembly further decreased its influence in the national government.28

What Explains the More Favorable Environment in Santa Cruz?

While elites in Santa Cruz and Guayas alike were threatened by charismatic presidents on the left who disrupted the past influence of their regions, these threats were much sharper in Bolivia due to differences in ethnic politics, party-building experiences and the prior depth of market reforms. First, ethnic cleavages play a more significant role in Bolivia, where a much larger percentage of the population identifies as indigenous (62 percent according to the 2001 census) than in Ecuador (7 percent according to the 2001 census).29 Although Aymaras and Quechus constitute a majority of the population in Bolivia’s five highland departments, mestizos and whites make up the majority in Santa Cruz (but only a third of the population nationwide). Thus the economic cleavages discussed above are reinforced in Bolivia by ethnic cleavages; Evo Morales’s victory represents not just the victory of a leftist project, but of the country’s first indigenous
leader since the Spanish conquest. In interviews in Santa Cruz, movement leaders routinely voiced fears of ethnic domination by the highlands, whereas their counterparts in Guayas rarely did (and could not, in reference to Correa, who is not indigenous). Elites in both regions have suffered from the collapse of established channels of national representation, but in Guayas they were not displaced by indigenous challengers to the same degree as in Santa Cruz. At the same time, while ethnic cleavages reinforce territorial cleavages in Bolivia more than in Ecuador, migration to Santa Cruz by Aymaran and Quechuan highlanders who support the MAS has complicated this dynamic. Approximately one-third of the Santa Cruz electorate supported the MAS in the 2005 elections and in the 2009 referendum, a number that increased to 43 percent in Morales’s December 2009 reelection. These results explain the urgency of the framing efforts by movement leaders that are analyzed below.

In addition to his indigenous identity, Morales has built a highly competitive party to support his project, whereas Correa has not. In Bolivia the MAS was able to use its victories in the late 1990s in municipal elections in Cochabamba to build a party apparatus and to articulate a set of ethnopopulist appeals that resonated powerfully in the highlands. So soon after its creation, the MAS’s second place finish in the 2002 presidential election and resounding victory in the 2005 election operated as a major impetus for the autonomy movement in Santa Cruz, even though, as Raúl Madrid argues, the MAS has refrained from making exclusionary ethnic appeals. While economic elites in Guayaquil rue the national decline of the PSC, their situation is not further complicated by successful party building efforts on the left. Notwithstanding its national reach, CONAIE in Ecuador has had a difficult time vis-à-vis the party system, opting to form Pachakutik in 1996 only after a lengthy period of eschewing party politics. Although Pachakutik has succeeded in electing legislators and mayors, its decision in 2000 to forge an alliance with Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez against a democratically elected President (Mahuad) has roiled the party. In the 2006 presidential elections, Pachakutik’s candidate Luis Macas won a scant 2 percent of the vote. A more successful indigenous party building experience in Ecuador most likely would have provided further impetus to the movement in Guayas.

The reversal of more significant market reforms in Bolivia has also given the autonomy movement greater incentives to organize. As is well documented, Bolivia experienced one of the most radical processes of economic liberalization in Latin America. The New Economic Policy adopted by the MNR-ADN coalition in 1985 and faithfully defended by four subsequent administrations marked a dramatic rupture with the period of state capitalism that was initiated by the Revolution. Precisely because two decades of market reform produced tangible benefits for Santa Cruz, including profitability for firms and jobs for workers in the department’s agricultural and service activities, Morales’s critique of these reforms fueled the autonomy movement. In contrast to Bolivia’s radical market reforms, Ecuador marks the other extreme in Latin America. Despite President Correa’s claim that traditional parties like the PSC imposed neoliberalism on Ecuador, in fact major attempts at liberalization and privatization by Presidents León Febres Cordero (1984–1988), Sixto Durán Ballen

If movement leaders in Santa Cruz perceived greater threats than in Guayas, they also faced a more opportune economic environment. Although Santa Cruz and Guayas share structural advantages as the most vibrant subnational region in each country, the location of natural resources creates an advantage for the former and a challenge for the latter. Whereas Santa Cruz and the other lowland departments that are pushing for autonomy are the site of Latin America’s second most extensive natural gas reserves, Ecuador’s petroleum reserves are concentrated not on the coast but in the impoverished provinces of the Amazon. Guayas dominates the country’s most important non-oil export activities (bananas, cacao, shrimp), but movement participants fear that fiscal autonomy might jeopardize its access to oil rents.37 In contrast, the belief that producing regions in Bolivia should enjoy a larger share of the revenues from “their” hydrocarbons has reinforced the Santa Cruz movement and facilitated alliances with advocates of autonomy in three other lowland departments—Beni, Pando, and Tarija.38 These alliances are much less developed—and much less threatening due to the absence of hydrocarbons—between Guayas and the coastal provinces of El Oro, Los Ríos, and Manabí, which have pursued mostly separate approaches after also holding pro-autonomy votes in 2000.

Beyond the location of hydrocarbons, the movement in Guayas is further constrained by the many troubles that have beset the province in the last decade. The private sector in Guayas remains the most dynamic in the country, but its leading firms have faced real challenges. Most important is the failure of Guayaquil’s largest and most influential banks, Filanbanco and Banco del Progreso, to recover from the financial crisis of the late 1990s, itself the result of poor management practices and shoddy bank supervision. Important additional challenges include the failure of the Noboa group to secure preferential access to banana markets in Europe and the devastating outbreak of white spot disease in Guayas’s shrimp sector. Finally, according to one Guayaquil business leader, the increase in the size of the state that resulted from Ecuador’s oil boom has in turn increased the number of Guayaquil businesses that count state-owned enterprises among their most important customers, a dynamic that reduces support for autonomy.39

The Role of Mobilizing Structures in Conservative Autonomy Movements

Conservative autonomy movements in Santa Cruz and Guayas have enjoyed support from three well-financed mobilizing structures—business associations, elite-led civic associations, and subnational governments under the control of sympathetic officials. Shifting from the external environment to factors internal to each movement, mobilizing structures have created a more resilient movement in Santa Cruz than in Guayas.

Threatened by what they perceive as the socialism of Presidents Morales and Correa, business associations in Santa Cruz and Guayas have directed resources toward each region’s autonomy movement. In Santa Cruz, powerful sectoral business associations
such as the Chamber of Agriculture, the Chamber of Hydrocarbons, and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce are all grouped together in a region-wide association called the Santa Cruz Federation of Private Entrepreneurs of Bolivia (FEPB-SC). In 2005 the FEPB-SC broke ranks with Bolivia’s national umbrella-wide business organization (the Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs of Bolivia or CEPB) over the latter’s unwillingness to adopt a more combative stance vis-à-vis Morales. Subsequent to its own drive for autonomy from the CEPB, the FEPB-SC has emerged as an aggressive advocate of the broader, regional drive for autonomy from the national government. In this role, the FEPB-SC has emphasized private property issues, including fears of land invasions by MAS supporters, which tap into the common cause which business owners in the region can find as owners of land and capital. Business support has taken on a range of forms, from sponsoring trips by business leaders to the United States, where they have met with representatives of the U.S. government and international organizations to make the case for autonomy, to offering hats and T-shirts to people who agree to sign autonomy petitions. Likewise, business chambers have supported the autonomy movement in Guayas. For example, in the attempt to promote autonomy by publicizing parallels between Guayas and other pro-autonomy movements, the region’s Chamber of Production sponsored the April 2005 visit to Guayaquil of Jordi Pujol, the Catalan champion of autonomy, as well as the March 2005 visit of Rubén Costas, then president of the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee. According to journalists who covered the large pro-autonomy demonstration in January 2005, many businesses transported workers to and from the protest in downtown Guayaquil in company buses. Business support also defrayed the cost of an eleven-page advertising supplement in the New York Times Magazine on July 1, 2007, which painted Guayaquil as a model city distant from the crisis politics of the rest of the country.

Despite efforts by individual businesses and business chambers, however, business support for autonomy in Guayas has been hampered by the absence of a territorial body that can bring together disparate sectoral interests. Whereas the FEPB in Santa Cruz has allowed business to speak with a single voice in favor of autonomy, in Guayas each sector is integrated vertically into nationally organized associations such as the Chambers of Commerce, Production, and Construction. In contrast to Santa Cruz, capital owners in Guayas are a class divided. In the past, traditional elite families constituted a closed and intimate social group characterized by membership in the Guayaquil Naval Club and sponsorship of the Guayaquil Charity Board. More recently, Guayas has witnessed the emergence of a much more fragmented set of new economic elites who have no common organizational forum, including the Universo newspaper conglomerate, the Sarniskys’s Mi Comisariato supermarket chain, Guayaquil’s one remaining bank (Banco de Guayaquil), the feuding heirs of Lucho Noboa’s banana empire (siblings Alvaro and Isabelita), and the Lebanese-Ecuadorian Isaías brothers, who are currently facing extradition charges for alleged embezzlement during the 1999 banking crisis.

Conservative autonomy movements have also benefited from civic associations that include business organizations but that seek to represent a broader set of regional civil
society interests. These long-standing associations—the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee (Comité Pro-Santa Cruz or CPSC) and the Guayaquil Civic Board (Junta Cívica de Guayaquil or JCG)—have organized, funded, coordinated, and even directed the contentious activities that define these movements. In Bolivia the CPSC originated in the early 1950s in opposition to the Revolution and the redistributive changes that were then unfolding in the highlands. When conflict between east and west worsened after 2003, CPSC President Rubén Costas (2003–2005) emerged as the de facto leader of the autonomy movement, directing the critical June 2004 and January 2005 rallies, and parlaying his experience as head of the CPSC into a successful run for Prefect of Santa Cruz following the introduction of direct elections in December 2005. In the words of its spokesman, “the CPSC is doing all that it can to prevent a leftist agenda, supported by NGOs, from sabotaging our successful experience here in Santa Cruz.”

In Ecuador the JCG has sought to play a similar role as the CPSC by serving as an officially nonpartisan body that speaks for territorially specific civil society interests and helping to organize the large pro-autonomy protests of 2000, 2005, and 2008. However, in contrast to the unity of the CPSC, the strength of the JCG has dissipated as a result of a paralyzing internal fissure that took place in 2005. In that year, a splinter faction calling itself the New Civic Board of Guayaquil (Nueva Junta Cívica de Guayaquil or NJCG) split from the older group over its frustration with a lack of dynamism in the JCG. The young businessmen who lead the NJCG complain that the JCG was unwilling to relax its cap on membership at 500, which has kept it an elite club, and support the adoption of a much more explicitly political line against the Correa government. In 2006 members of the NJCG took the lead in creating a new transnational organization, the International Confederation for Regional Freedom and Autonomy (CONFILAR), through which they hope to strengthen the Guayas movement by networking with advocates of regional autonomy and economic liberalism in other countries, including Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela.

Not only have conservative autonomy movements derived varying levels of support from elite-led civil society organizations, they have also directly benefited from subnational governments that are dominated by pro-autonomy politicians. In other words, these social movements have been able to appropriate resources under the control of the subnational state in their struggle for autonomy from the national state. Though early social movement theorists precluded the possibility that mobilizing structures would include parts of the state apparatus itself, more recent work on progressive movements has challenged the state-society divide by drawing our attention to movement participants who, for example, may belong to neighborhood organizations at the same time that they work within the state. Given the significant supporting roles played by prefects and mayors in Santa Cruz and Guayas, this divide should also be questioned in the study of conservative movements.

In Santa Cruz Rubén Costas did not surrender his role as a leader of the movement when he shifted from being President of the CPSC to Prefect of the department in 2005. As Prefect, Costas has been able to use public resources in ways that benefit the autonomy movement. For example, in the run-up to the unofficial autonomy referendum...
in May 2008, which was coordinated by the departmental government over the opposition of La Paz, Costas proposed a Dignified Autonomous Salary (salario digno autónomo) for public workers in the department. As promised, Costas raised this minimum salary to 1,000 bolivarianos following the approval of the referendum.49 Ecuador provides even starker illustration of the importance of a supportive subnational government. As mayor of Guayaquil (1992–2000) and as a powerful former president (1984–1988), León Febres Cordero consistently opposed the drive for autonomy from a national government that he continued to manipulate from his perch in Guayaquil. After Febres Cordero left office, the autonomy movement rapidly gathered strength under the mayoral administration of his successor, Jaime Nebot, a failed presidential candidate. Nebot has used the mayoralty to support the movement, directing municipal agencies to organize pro-autonomy rallies and strikes, headlining the list of speakers at demonstrations, and cooperating closely with the JCG.

Framing Choices and Conservative Autonomy Movements

Thanks to the benefits they derive from powerful mobilizing structures, conservative autonomy movements in Bolivia and Ecuador have enjoyed key advantages relative to progressive social movements in Latin America. But support offered by these structures comes at a potentially significant cost. Movement leaders worry that elite sponsorship, along with the consequent association of these movements with local power holders in the popular imaginary, will negatively impact their legitimacy.50 In response to fears that opponents could dismiss these movements as elite projects, movement leaders have made efforts to portray each movement as a defense of territorial interests that are common to all residents of Santa Cruz and Guayas, regardless of the significant class and ethnic differences that otherwise divide them. These efforts have in turn generated framing contests with the national government, often in the form of responses by presidents who seek to question the cross-class and pan-ethnic status of these movements.

To counter the perception that only elites in Santa Cruz care about autonomy, movement leaders have championed the social construction of a deeper sense of territorial identity and grievance among residents of Santa Cruz. Many of these residents are recent migrants of Aymaran and Quechuan descent, who were displaced from the highlands when market reforms dramatically reduced mining jobs in the 1980s, and who gravitated toward the region that benefited disproportionately from those same reforms—Santa Cruz. In the struggle to expand its membership base, movement leaders have sought to broaden the traditional definition of what it means to be “cruceño” or “from Santa Cruz.” In the words of the media director of the CPSC, “We support the idea that anybody who lives here now is a cruceño. You don’t have to be born here to consider yourself cruceño.”51 Furthermore, movement leaders have consistently sought to emphasize what they believe to be Santa Cruz’ special identity, now referred to as “crucenidad.”52 For example, the fact that five centuries ago at the end of Spanish colonial rule Santa Cruz was governed by the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, whereas
the rest of Bolivia was governed by the Viceroyalty of Peru, figures prominently in attempts by movement leaders to naturalize the notion of crucenidad.

These framing choices have been directly contested by President Evo Morales who sees the movement as the work of “oligarchs” struggling to defend the concentration of land ownership.53 MAS supporters also dismiss the autonomy movement as “fascist” by focusing on the movement’s most radical component organization, the Santa Cruz Youth Union (Unión Juvenil Crucenista or UJC). Having originated as an antirevolutionary force in the 1950s, the UJC has sponsored acts of violence in recent years, including the October 2003 repression of pro-Morales indigenous groups in the main square of Santa Cruz. Morales’s counterframing efforts have also been aided by critical voices within Santa Cruz. For example, the social justice wing of the Catholic Church in the department has criticized the pursuit of autonomy without concomitant measures that would redistribute economic and political power within Santa Cruz. These critics attribute the urgency of the current autonomy demand, encapsulated in the slogan “autonomía ya, carajo” (“autonomy now, dammit”) to elite fears that heightened migrant flows are threatening their political, economic, and social control of the department.54 Framing contests have also opened up within the movement due to demands made by its most extreme faction, grouped together in Nación Camba (Camba Nation). Using a pan-ethnic word for “lowlander” (camba, as opposed to colla or “highlander”), this secessionist group has asserted nationhood for Santa Cruz, generating what social movement theorists call a “radical flank effect” that redounds to the benefit of more moderate groups within the autonomy movement.55

The active framing efforts of the movement in Santa Cruz have not gone unnoticed in Guayas, where movement leaders admire the rhetorical innovation of Santa Cruz elites. In the words of one of the leaders of the NJCG, “we’ve got to do a much better job reaching out to the masses in order to combat the perception that autonomy is only an elite issue.”56 As a form of outreach, movement leaders in Guayaquil consistently reinforce the view that the province has a distinct identity from the rest of the country, centered on different customs of music, dance, speech, and food that cut across class and ethnic lines. Just as the Santa Cruz movement harkens back to its different colonial status, movement participants in Guayas proudly refer to the province’s early declaration of independence from Spain in 1820, when it enjoyed a brief period of autonomy as the Free Province of Guayaquil under the leadership of poet José Joaquín de Olmedo. To inculcate a stronger sense of territorial identity, the Guayaquil Civic Board sponsored workshops in high schools in 2007 that were organized around the concept of “local citizenship,” and that asked students to brainstorm about what makes Guayaquil distinct within Ecuador.57

While the creation of CONFILAR in 2006 has made it easier for conservative autonomy movements in Bolivia and Ecuador to compare notes on strategy, it would be a mistake to overstate the significance of this incipient transnational network relative to the domestic factors that have posed greater framing challenges for movement leaders in Guayas relative to Santa Cruz. Most important, President Rafael Correa has made it difficult for movement leaders to frame their movement in starkly territorial terms. First,
Correa’s birth in Guayaquil has legitimated his attempts to dispute the vision of Guayas that is endorsed by the autonomy movement. Correa enjoys a solid base of popular support in Guayaquil, tapping into the sectors that sustained Bucaram’s successful bid for the presidency in 1996. Throughout the constitutional revision process, many working class guayaquileños felt torn between their admiration of Correa and their desire for autonomy from Quito. Unlike President Morales in Bolivia, Correa can call on his personal knowledge of the class and ethnic distinctions that divide this would-be autonomous region; also unlike Morales, who was barred from even traveling to Santa Cruz in 2008 due to threats of violence, Correa travels extensively in Guayas, putting movement leaders on the defensive on their own turf. Second, Correa has used his significant oratorical powers to frame the movement in elitist terms. For example, Correa resuscitated a pejorative term for upper-class residents of Guayaquil, “pelucones,” a term used in the colonial period to describe the aristocracy’s penchant for wigs (“pelucas”). As argued above, the image that this term evokes of a traditional and unified dominant class is woefully outdated, but Correa’s consistent application of the term to the autonomy movement has resonated broadly.

At the same time, despite his vigorous support for autonomy, Mayor Jaime Nebot has complicated efforts by movement leaders to explain how autonomy would benefit all residents of Guayas and not just elites. In his first two terms as mayor (2000–2008), Nebot’s zero tolerance policy vis-à-vis the informal sector and his preferential treatment of large firms has led many to suspect that residents would not benefit equally under a regime of autonomy. Nebot’s gentrification campaign and use of a newly empowered municipal police force to crack down on street vendors have alienated the very migrants who, in Santa Cruz, the autonomy movement has sought to woo.

Conclusion

A new type of social movement has emerged in Latin America in the last decade. Similar in form but not in content to the progressive social movements that social scientists have studied in the region in detail since the 1970s, conservative autonomy movements are deploying the same repertoires of contention as other movements, but to very different ends. These movements demand territorial autonomy not to defend communal governance, as is the case with indigenous movements, but to defend the pursuit of the market-oriented policies that national governments increasingly are questioning throughout Latin America. Beyond simply demanding to keep more of the tax revenues that are collected in subnational regions, conservative autonomy movements are demanding deeper changes that would allow subnational regions to deviate from national development models.

Although these autonomy drives are still unfolding, it is not too early to study them, and scholars should look to the social movement literature for clues as to how they can be understood. This literature can be used to classify these phenomena as social movements, to explain why they emerged where and when they did in Latin America, and to
account for the greater strength of Bolivia’s conservative autonomy movement relative to Ecuador’s. With respect to classification, the critical roles played by local economic elites do not mean that these phenomena are not social movements, though they do indicate the appropriateness of “conservative” as a descriptive label. In addition to local economic elites, local political elites such as mayors and prefects also guide these movements. Perhaps even more than in the study of progressive social movements, understanding conservative autonomy movements will thus require research across the state-society divide.

Social movement theory also helps explain why Bolivia and Ecuador are the only two countries in Latin America to generate conservative autonomy movements, as well as the timing of their emergence. The concentration of political power in the national capital, combined with the locus of private sector dynamism in a subnational region that is not the capital, set the stage for these movements. No other country in Latin America experiences such a stark disjunction—a structural reality that will likely inhibit the emergence of full-fledged conservative autonomy movements elsewhere. While necessary, this structural opportunity was insufficient in Bolivia and Ecuador. To become activated, these movements also required the articulation of political threats in the form of changes that undermined established channels for each region’s participation in national institutions.

In addition to using social movement theory to better understand conservative autonomy movements, this article also shows that broadening the empirical range of social movement theory to include nonprogressive movements can deliver theoretical and conceptual payoffs. This is particularly the case when the analysis shifts from the study of the external environments that produce these movements to the internal factors that explain their evolution, including mobilizing structures and framing choices. Relative to progressive social movements, conservative autonomy movements have a far easier time tapping well-resourced mobilizing structures, including the business associations, civic organizations, and subnational governments that propelled the twin movements in Bolivia and Ecuador. But the same advantageous position that these movements enjoy vis-à-vis mobilizing structures renders them vulnerable to attempts by opponents to dismiss these movements as elite phenomena. Thus, mobilizing structures facilitate conservative autonomy movements while at the same time generating a more difficult set of framing challenges which movement leaders must successfully overcome.

NOTES

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9. Interview with Carlos Baquerizo, President of the Junta Cívica de Guayaquil, June 4, 2008, Guayaquil.

10. Interviews with Juan Carlos Urenda, October 25, 2005, Santa Cruz; and Joffre Campaña, June 4, 2008, Guayaquil.


15. However, at 38 percent, the abstention rate was nearly twice the average rate for Bolivian elections, with many Santa Cruz residents accepting Morales’s repudiation of the referendum as unconstitutional.

16. Interview with Juan Falconi, former Superintendent of Banks, June 5, 2008, Guayaquil.

17. Interview with Nicolás Lapentti, Prefect of Guayas, June 12, 2008, Guayaquil.


21. A partial exception here is Mexico, whose tier of northern states constitutes an important region for export-oriented industries.


28. Interview with Juan José Illingworth, former National Deputy, June 10, 2008, Guayaquil.

29. This likely underestimates the indigenous population in Ecuador, which the 2003 *Race Report* of the Inter-American Dialogue estimates at 24.85 percent.


32. Interviews with Campaña and Palacios.

33. Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship*.

34. Van Cott, *Radical Democracy*.

35. Conaghan and Malloy, *Unsettling Statecraft*; Gamara, “Hybrid Presidentialism.”

36. Interview with Elio Pedraza, departmental labor leader, October 25, 2005, Santa Cruz.

37. Interview with José Garzozi, Director of Tourism for the municipality of Guayaquil, June 13, 2008, Guayaquil.

38. Interview with Raúl Kliefker, President of the Bolivian Chamber of Hydrocarbons, October 10, 2005, Santa Cruz.
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40. Interview with Gabriel Dabdoub, President of CAINCO, October 26, 2005; and Juan Armando Antelo, former president of CAO, October 24, 2005, Santa Cruz.
41. Interviews with Gerardo Velasco, Executive Secretary, National Chamber of Industries, October 18, 2005, La Paz; and Hugo Carlos Molina, former Prefect of Santa Cruz, October 28, 2005, Santa Cruz.
42. Anonymous interview with CEPB official, October 19, 2005; Interview with Marco Antonio Aimaretti, Executive Director of CEJIS, October 29, 2005, Santa Cruz.
43. Interview with Illingworth.
44. Interview with Emilio Palacio, Political Editor of El Universal, June 5, 2008, Guayaquil.
45. Interview with Castro.
46. Interview with Henry Raad, former Municipal Councilor, June 12, 2008; Guayaquil.
47. Interviews with Francisco Franco, Juan Carlos Sanchez, and Nicolas Romero, members of the NJCG, June 12, 2008, Guayaquil.
48. See Rebecca Abers and Margaret Keck, “Mobilizing the State: The Erratic Partner in Brazil’s Participatory Water Policy.” Politics and Society, 37 (June 2009), 289–314.
50. Interviews with Dabdoub, Franco, and Ortiz.
51. Interview with Castro.
52. Paula Peña, La permanente construcción de lo cruceño (La Paz: Fundación PIEB, 2003).
54. Interview with Father Mauricio Bacardit, Director of Pastoral Social Cáritas, October 24, 2005, Santa Cruz.
56. Interview with Rafael Cuesta, member of the NJCG, June 12, 2008, Guayaquil.
59. Interviews with José García, President of the Chamber of Small Enterprises, June 11, 2008; and Octavio Villacreses, opposition Municipal Councilor, June 11, 2008, Guayaquil.

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